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Abstract
This paper presents and advocates an approach to the semantics of
opinion statements, including matters of personal taste and moral claims.
In this framework, ‘outlook-based semantics’, the circumstances of evalu-
ation are not composed by supplementing a possible world with a judge
(as in ‘world-judge relativism’); rather, outlooks replace possible worlds
in the role of circumstance of evaluation. Outlooks are refinements of
worlds that settle not only matters of fact but also matters of opinion.
Several virtues of the framework and advantages over existing implemen-
tations of world-judge relativism are demonstrated in this paper. First,
several authors have argued that world-judge relativism does not actually
explain the ‘disagreement’ of ‘faultless disagreement’, while a straight-
forward explanation suggests itself in outlook-based semantics. Second,
outlook-based semantics gives a satisfactory account of subjective atti-
tude verbs which allows for lack of opinionatedness. Third, outlook-based
semantics unproblematically explains the connection-building role of aes-
thetic discourse and the group-relevance of discretionary assertions, while
capturing the same effects in world-judge relativism obviates the purpose
of the judge parameter. Finally, because the proposed circumstances of
evaluation (outlooks) are entirely analogous to possible worlds, the frame-
work is easy to use and extend.
1 Introduction
1.1 Statements of opinion
This is a paper about statements of opinion (‘subjective’ claims), and their
opposition to factual or ‘objective’ claims. Subjective attitude verbs like Swedish
tycka (‘think [that]’ or ‘have the opinion [that]’) are sensitive to the distinction
in question. Like Norwegian synes, French trouver, Mandarin Chinese jué dé,
and arguably English find (Stephenson, 2007a; Sæbø, 2009; Bouchard, 2012a),
tycka embeds only matters of opinion, including taste judgments as in (1a) and
(1b), moral claims involving predicates like ‘wrong’ and deontic modals like
‘should’ as in (1c) and (1d) respectively, and perceptual judgments as in (1e).
(1) a. Jag tycker att skolmaten är god.
‘I think[opinion] that the school food is tasty.’
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b. Jag tycker att det är kul att jobba.
‘I think[opinion] it’s fun to work.’
c. Jag tycker att det är fel att inte hela Sverige hjälps åt.
‘I think[opinion] it’s wrong that not all of Sweden helps.’
d. Jag tycker att vi ska ta hand om varandra.
‘I think[opinion] that we should take care of each other.’
e. Jag tycker att den ser ut som en champinjon.
‘I think[opinion] it looks like a mushroom.’
In cases involving factual matters such as whether someone is a doctor as in
(2a) or what day it is as in (2b), tycka is not appropriate, although the verb tro
‘believe’ is acceptable. The same is true for statements about what will happen
in the future like the one in (2c), and statements of epistemic possibility as in
(2d), as well as religious statements such as (2e).
(2) a. Jag tror/#tycker att hon är läkare.
‘I believe/think[opinion] that she is a doctor.’
b. Jag tror/#tycker att det är tisdag idag.
‘I believe/think[opinion] that it is Tuesday today.’
c. Jag tror/#tycker att jag kommer att vinna.
‘I believe/think[opinion] I’m going to win.’
d. Jag tror/#tycker att det kanske borjar kvart över.
‘I believe/think[opinion] that it maybe starts quarter past.’
e. Jag tror/#tycker att det finns en Gud.
‘I believe/think[opinion] that there is a God.’
Example (2c) casts some doubt on the suggestion from MacFarlane (2003, 2011)
that so-called ‘future contingents’ such as this example should both be treated in
the same way as predicates of personal taste as in (1a) and (1b). With respect to
this diagnostic at least, future contingents are not of the same ilk as statements
of taste. Indeed, it would be odd to talk as if what will happen in the future is
a matter of opinion (#In my opinion, I will win), although it is reasonable to
imagine that there is no fact of the matter. A similar point can be made about
(2d), which militates against lumping together epistemic modals and predicates
of personal taste, contra Stephenson (2007a) and MacFarlane (2011), i.a. It may
also be interesting to note that the existence of God is not treated as a matter of
opinion, even though in societies with religious tolerance such matters are ones
to which everyone has the right to their own viewpoint, in some sense. (In this
respect religious matters contrast with ordinary factual matters like whether or
not someone is a doctor; if Sue is actually a doctor but John believes she’s a
laywer, then John violates the norm of having correct factual beliefs.)
If you ask a Swedish speaker why one can’t embed It’s Tuesday under tycka,
the answer is typically, “because it’s a matter of fact.” In general, at some
level of approximation, the statements that can be embedded under tycka are
the ones about which disagreements cannot be settled with the help of further
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empirical evidence (including evidence that will come once we wait and see what
happens in the future, given the behavior of future contingents) or more careful
reflection as to what conclusions are validly drawn. (Mathematical conclusions
arguably do not depend on any evidence at all, so in some cases there may not
be any amount of evidence required. Still, mathematical claims can be settled
through more careful reflection.) In other words, a statement is embeddable
under tycka if two perfectly rational and well-informed agents could judge it
differently without making a mistake, that is, if according to one, it holds, and
according to the other, it does not hold. Following Kölbel (2003), I will use
the term discretionary to describe such matters.1,2 This gives us a concise way
of stating the generalization about what can be embedded under tycka: The
complement of tycka must express a discretionary proposition (cf. Bouchard’s
(2012a) ‘Subjectivity Requirement’ for what he calls ‘opinion verbs’).
The predicates embeddable under subjective attitude verbs like tycka corre-
spond more or less exactly to those allowing for faultless disagreement (Kölbel,
2003) (sometimes called subjective disagreement, e.g., by Stojanovic (2007)), ex-
hibited in dialogues like (3), which occur not only in philosophy papers but also
in the wild; (4) and (5) are naturally-occurring examples:
(3) The chili dialogue
John: This chili is tasty.
Mary: No, it’s not.
(4) Tom: I really do appreciate what you’ve done for me. This is a good
job.
Charlie: No, it ’s not. It stinks. It’s putting your life on the line for
someone else’s money.
(5) Sam: It’s just that, you know, compared to what I paid back home it’s
pretty reasonable.
Idi: No, no, no, no, it’s not. It’s not reasonable at all.
1Kölbel defined the term slightly differently, but I believe that we are characterizing the
same concept. According to his definition, a statement is discretionary if it is not governed by
a priori rules which in some cases dictate that speakers ought to agree, and in other cases do
not. “For example, usually teachers will allow that learners believe that chocolate ice cream
is delicious even if they themselves believe it isn’t” (p. 68). Contents such as the deliciousness
of ice cream are thus discretionary by his definition.
2It is not entirely uncontroversial that moral judgments would persist in the face of un-
limited reflection and information. See for example the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
entry on Moral Relativism (http://www.iep.utm.edu/moral-re/). So a more precise formula-
tion would specify that the use of tycka with moral judgments implies a philosophical view on
the part of Swedish speakers that such judgments may differ within the space of perfect ratio-
nality and complete information. Whether or not they may in fact do so is not the issue; the
issue is how the predicates in question are treated within the speech community. Philosophers
may agree or disagree, but this seems to be the ‘folk ideology’ as it were. (The framework
of Rabinowicz (2008) seems to be a reasonable way of caching out the notion that two ideal
agents may disagree on a moral matter: Agents may have different preferences, and there are
certain constraints on what constitutes an acceptable preference, but within those confines
there is room for faultless disagreement.)
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There are two important things to notice about these: First, the second inter-
locutor contradicts the first. Second, neither one appears to have said something
false. Under a classical view on meaning, if two propositions contradict each
other, then one of them should be false. This observation suggests that the
classical view on meaning does not suffice.3
There are at least four major approaches to the problem of faultless disagree-
ment posed by discretionary statements. An objectivist (also called absolutist)
denies the second premise – that one of the statements is actually false – and
maintains the classical view. The contextualist argues that discretionary state-
ments depend on a contextually-given standard or judge for their truth value.
Expressivists (also known as non-cognitivists) say that discretionary statements
are not truth-evaluable at all, and relativists say that they depend on a judge
or perspective for their truth value.
This paper presents and defends a particular solution to this problem called
outlook-based semantics. It can be filed under the category of ‘relativism’, but
unlike what springs most immediately to mind when philosophers of language
hear the term ‘relativism’ (which I call world-judge relativism), this form of rela-
tivism does not supplement possible worlds with a judge parameter to form the
circumstance of evaluation. Rather, possible worlds are replaced with what are
called ‘outlooks’. This paper argues that, unlike world-judge relativism, outlook-
based semantics straightforwardly explains faultless disagreement, provides a
satisfactory account of attitude verbs which accounts for lack of opinionated-
ness, and unproblematically explains the connection-building role of aesthetic
discourse and the group-relevance of discretionary assertions, while being easy
to use and extend.
In the following section, a brief review of world-judge relativism is given,
setting the stage for the presentation of outlook-based semantics in §3. In §4
we will turn to pragmatics, and §5 gives a formal implementation.
2 Introducing world-judge relativism
2.1 Contextualism
Relativism is best understood in contrast to contextualism. Under a simple,
naive version of contextualism, in the chili dialogue, John is saying, ‘The chili
is tasty to me’ and Mary is saying, ‘The chili is tasty to me.’ This means that
the interlocutors are actually not expressing contradictory propositions. But
3Note that discretionary matters being as they are does not mean that there is (or ought
to be) no disputing about taste, as the old adage goes, and as some philosophers claim. For
example, Egan (2010, pp. 18-19) writes that resolving a taste dispute would unreasonably
“require one of the parties to the dispute to self-attribute a property that she lacks.” But
this does not mean that it is unreasonable to try to persuade someone to change where
they stand on a matter of taste. One’s taste judgements are the result of associations and
experiences, which can be affected by one’s interlocutor through the telling of stories, the
sharing of experiences, and the juxtaposition of elements. So it is perfectly rational to attempt
to change someone’s tastes through such methods. But doing so does not amount to providing
a rational argument for the conclusion.
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then it becomes difficult to explain the felicity of no, signalling disagreement, in
John’s response. As Lasersohn (2005) points out, disagreement is a matter of
conflicting contents rather than conflicting characters in Kaplan’s (1977) sense.4
In the following dialogue, the characters conflict but the contents are perfectly
compatible:
(6) The doctor dialogue
A: I am a doctor.
B: #No, I’m not a doctor!
It is perfectly possible for A to be a doctor while B is not a doctor, so A being
a doctor does not conflict with B not being a doctor. So the content of A’s
assertion does not conflict with the content of B’s assertion, even though the
characters conflict. The oddness of B’s no in (6) can be understood under the
assumption that no in this usage signals disagreement, and this means conflict
with respect to content. Conflict with respect to character does not suffice for
disagreement.
If the statements in the chili dialogue contained a hidden speaker-indexical,
then we might expect such dialogues to have the same status as the doctor
dialogue, because we would not have a conflict with respect to content, only
character. Indeed, if the experiencer is explicitly anchored to the speaker, then
no is no longer perfectly felicitous:
(7) The frog legs dialogue
A: Frog legs taste good to me.
B: #No, frog legs don’t taste good to me.
(Example adapted from Moltmann (2010, 190).) Now, granted, B’s response in
(7) is not quite as bad as B’s response in (6). Huvenes (2012) makes a similar
observation in connection with the following dialogue, which he points out is
not quite as bad as the doctor exchange:
(8) Sally: I like this chili.
Mark: I disagree, it’s too hot for me.
This is a fact that must be accounted for (and an account will be given in this
paper). Nevertheless, B’s response in (7) is clearly much stranger than Mary’s
in the original chili dialogue in (3).
2.2 Relativism
The kind of analysis that Lasersohn advocates is a relativist one. The intuition
behind this solution is that the truth of a statement is relative not only to a
4Recall that the character of a sentence containing an indexical such as I, you, here, or now,
is the aspect of its meaning that remains constant across different contexts of use. Character
is the level at which ‘It is my birthday today’ means the same thing no matter who says it or
when. The content of a sentence containing indexicals is the result of ‘filling in’ the indexicals
with their values from the context. The content of It is my birthday today spoken by me on
one day is not the content of the same sentence spoken by me or someone else on another day.
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world (and a context of utterance), but also to a judge. So rather than defining
the truth value of a sentence φ just with respect to a context of utterance c and
a world w:5 JφKc;w = T iff ...
(where T stands for ‘true’), Lasersohn adds a judge parameter, so that truth
is defined with respect to a world w and a judge j, in addition to a context of
utterance c: JφKc;w,j = T iff ...
A world-judge pair thus constitutes a circumstance of evaluation for determining
the truth of a sentence, so the content of a statement is not a set of worlds
simpliciter, but a set of world-judge pairs, those world-judge pairs such that the
statement is true in the world, according to the judge. The content of The chili
is tasty, for example, is the set of world-judge pairs such that the chili is tasty
to the judge in the world. This makes it possible for John and Mary to express
conflicting contents in dialogues like the chili dialogue.
There are more sophisticated varieties of contextualism that have been de-
veloped in response to Lasersohn’s argument (e.g. Glanzberg 2007, Schaffer 2009
Cappelen & Hawthorne 2009, ch. 4, Björnsson & Almér 2010, i.a.). Moltmann’s
(2010) and Pearson’s (2013) first-person genericity accounts can also be catego-
rized as sophisticated versions of contextualism. We will not discuss these, nor
will we discuss expressivism (see e.g. Blackburn (1984, 1998) and Gibbard (1990,
2003) regarding expressivism for moral judgments), or the kind of objectivism
advocated by Barker (2002, 2013) and Richard (2004, 2008), where the disagree-
ment in the chili dialogue is meta-linguistic, and not a genuine disagreement.
Kennedy & Willer’s (2016) proposal in terms of counterstance contingency will
be discussed only briefly in the section on attitude verbs.
Rather, this article focusses on a distinction between two kinds of relativism,
which I call world-judge relativism and simple relativism. The kind of relativism
just described, what I call world-judge relativism, is often taken as definitional of
relativism. For example, in a passage explaining what relativism is, Brogaard
(2008) writes that “the relativist’s circumstances are triples that consist of a
world and a time parameter... and an evaluator or judge parameter...” This
characterization holds of Lasersohn-style relativism (Lasersohn, 2005), where
possible worlds are paired with judges, Egan-style relativism (Egan, 2010), using
centered worlds (which is equivalent to adding a judge parameter, as Stephenson
(2007a) points out) and MacFarlane-style relativism (MacFarlane, 2003, 2007,
2011), which invokes the notion of a context of assessment.
But Brogaard’s characterization does not apply to every analysis that canon-
ically appears in citation lists under the ‘relativist’ heading. In particular, it
does not apply to Kölbel’s (2002) theory, which I wish to label simple relativism.
5I am following the common practice of using a semi-colon to separate the context of utter-
ance parameter from the parameters making up the circumstance of evaluation. Abstraction
over both yields the character of the sentence in Kaplan’s (1989) sense; the content of the
sentence is the result of abstacting over the circumstance of evaluation while fixing a given
context of utterance.
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Simple relativism is what I would like to advocate here, in a slightly different
form, namely outlook-based semantics. The kind of relativism advocated here
does not supplement worlds with judges in the circumstance of evaluation; rather
it replaces them by outlooks. So rather than:
JφKc;w = T iff ...
we have: JφKc;o = T iff ...
where o is an outlook (cf. Kölbel’s ‘perspectives’).6 The following section will
develop this idea in much greater detail.
3 Semantics
3.1 Basic notions
Let us begin with the notion of an outlook. An outlook is very much like a pos-
sible world. Like a possible world, an outlook is in some sense a ‘way the world
could be’, and determines the extensions of predicates and relations. There
is another possible world in which I became a professional opera singer and
reincarnated Maria Callas as I once dreamed. The extension of the predicate
‘opera singer’ includes me in that world. It does not include me in this world,
for better or worse. In the same way, the extensions of discretionary predicates
like ‘tasty’ differ from outlook to outlook. There are some outlooks according
to which frog legs are tasty – where frog legs are in the extension of the pred-
icate ‘tasty’ – and others where they are not. In the sense in which possible
worlds are said to be ‘complete’ (in contrast to, for example, situations), out-
looks settle the extensions of every single predicate and relation in the relevant
vocabulary. Outlooks are more complete than possible worlds: the predicates
and relations whose extensions they settle include discretionary ones like ‘tasty’
as well as non-discretionary ones like ‘opera singer’. So in an intuitive as well
as a technical sense, outlooks refine worlds, by specifying more information.
Just as propositions are sets of possible worlds in the classical theory, a
proposition is a set of outlooks in the present setting (to a first approxima-
tion; to accommodate presupposition, we will in the end treat propositions as
functions from outlooks to truth values). There are two different kinds of propo-
sitions: discretionary propositions and objective propositions. The former are
the contents of opinion statements, and the objects of tycka-attitudes; the latter
are the sorts of things that can be objectively true. But all propositions, both
discretionary and objective, are sets of outlooks. For example, the proposition
6Although outlooks replace possible worlds as circumstances of evaluation, possible worlds
are still part of the theory. They are crucial for making the distinction between discretionary
and objective propositions. A model for outlook-based semantics will thus determine not only
a set of outlooks but also a set of worlds. So at this level, worlds are not replaced by outlooks;
it is only insofar as outlooks, rather than worlds, are used as the circumstance of evaluation
that outlooks replace worlds according to the view I wish to promote.
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that I am an opera singer is the set of outlooks o such that the extension of
the predicate ‘opera singer’ contains me in o. The proposition that the chili is
tasty is the set of outlooks o according to which the chili is in the extension of
the predicate ‘tasty’ in o. More precisely: if Ω is the set of all outlooks, then a
proposition is a subset of Ω.
Sentences express propositions qua sets of outlooks, as their truth value is
relative to a given outlook. We assume a formal language L and a valuation
function J⋅K which assigns semantic values (extensions) to expressions of L rel-
ative to context of utterance c and an outlook o.7 The proposition expressed
by a given formula is the set of outlooks for which the valuation function, when
applied to the formula, assigns the value true. Let φ be a formula of L and letJφKc;o be the value of φ relative to context of utterance c and outlook o. With
this notation, we can say that the proposition expressed by φ in context c is the
set of outlooks o such that JφKc;o = T, where T stands for ‘true’. (When we treat
propositions as functions from outlooks to truth values, we will say instead that
the proposition expressed by φ in context c is that function f from outlooks to
truth values such that for all outlooks o, f(o) = JφKc;o.) We say that an outlook
o verifies a formula φ (wrt. context c) iff JφKc;o = T.
We will borrow the standard treatments of entailment and contradiction
from the classical approach. A formula φ entails another formula ψ if every
outlook that verifies φ also verifies ψ. Two formulas are contradictory if there
is no outlook verifying both of them, i.e., if the intersection of the propositions
they express is empty.
Some outlooks agree with the actual world on all matters of fact, settling
in addition all matters of opinion. These outlooks can be called refinements of
the actual world. In general, the set of outlooks that refine a given world is
called the refinement class for the world. Worlds and their refinement classes
stand in a one-to-one relation ∝. This picture can be visualized as in Figure
1, where each grey dot is an outlook, and each shaded area corresponds to a
possible world. The grey dots within a given shaded area are the refinements of
the coresponding possible world.8
What distinguishes objective propositions from discretionary ones is that
the objective propositions correspond to a set of possible worlds. We will stick
with the conception of propositions as sets of outlooks, so it is not that objective
propositions are sets of possible worlds; rather they correspond to sets of possible
7Here we are ignoring the model and assignment function parameters.
8Note that the notion of ‘refinement’ used here is precisely the one developed by Christian
List for the purpose of reconciling ‘folk’ and scientific levels of description and in the analysis of
chance and free will (List, 2013; List & Pivato, to appear). The powerset (set of subsets) ofW
– the set of possible worlds propositions – forms an algebra, in the sense that it is closed under
conjunction (intersection), disjunction (union), and negation (complement). The same is true
for the powerset of Ω. And the powerset ofW is isomorphic to the sub-algebra (subset, which
is also an algebra) of the powerset of Ω containing only objective propositions. Thus outlooks
provide a more fine-grained level of description than possible worlds, in List’s technical sense.
Also somewhat similar in spirit to the present work is Yablo’s (2016) work on ‘aboutness’,
where for example ‘loose talk’ can be modelled in terms of a ‘subject matter’ constituted by
an equivalence relation among possible worlds.
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Figure 1: Possible worlds (shaded areas) and the outlooks that refine them
worlds. A set of outlooks corresponds to a set of possible worlds in the relevant
sense if it is the union of refinement classes for some set of possible worlds.
Pictorially, any union of shaded areas in Figure 1 (including one single shaded
area or the empty set) is an objective proposition, as the dots in a given shaded
area make up the refinement class for a world. We can write this more formally
as follows. LetW be the set of possible worlds, and let Ω be the set of outlooks.
A set of outlooks O ⊆ Ω is an objective proposition if and only if there is some
subsetW ofW such that O = ⋃{O′ ⊆ Ω ∣ O′ ∝ w for some w ∈W}. For example,
the proposition that I am an opera singer is the set of outlooks o where the
predicate ‘opera singer’ includes me, and that is the union of refinement classes
for worlds w where I am an opera singer in w. A discretionary proposition is
a set of outlooks that is not an objective proposition; one that doesn’t ‘color
within the lines’, as it were.9 A discretionary proposition may in principle be
homogeneous with respect to some worlds; it is discretionary as long as it makes
a cut across some world. Propositions that are homogeneous with respect to
no worlds may be called ‘strongly discretionary’, where we define a strongly
discretionary proposition formally as a set of outlooks that is not a superset of
any refinement class of any world, and whose complement with respect to Ω is
also not a superset of any refinement class of any world. In other words, no
objective proposition entails either it or its negation.
Summarizing, we have the following definitions (against the background of
a set of possible worlds W and a set of outlooks Ω and a one-to-one relation ∝
among possible worlds and their refinement classes):
• Objective proposition
9If we make use of a three-valued logic in order to deal with presupposition, then we will
have to see propositions as functions from worlds to truth values, and then a discretionary
proposition can be defined as a function for which there are two refinements of the same world
such that one is assigned the value ‘true’ and the other is assigned ‘false’. We will come to
applications of this later.
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A set of outlooks O is an objective proposition if and only if there is some
subset W of W such that O = ⋃{O′ ⊆ Ω ∣ O′ ∝ w for some w ∈W}.
• Discretionary proposition
A set of outlooks O is a discretionary proposition if and only if it is not
an objective proposition.
• Strongly discretionary proposition
A set of outlooks O is a strongly discretionary proposition if and only if
there is no world w such that O is a superset of w’s refinement class, and
there is no world w such that the complement of O with respect to Ω is a
superset of w’s refinement class.
Note that we will need to refine these definitions slightly later, both to relativize
them to a particular common ground, and to take into account the possibility
for propositions to be undefined relative to a particular outlook.
A parallel distinction can be made between discretionary and non-discretionary
predicates. The latter are predicates whose extensions are constant across all
refinements of all worlds; the former are predicates whose extensions are hetero-
geneous across refinements of at least one world. (A predicate whose extension
is heterogeneous across refinements of all worlds may be called strongly discre-
tionary.) In this sense, a possible world fixes the extensions of all of the objective
predicates, and does not (necessarily) decide about the discretionary ones, while
an outlook fixes the extension of objective and discretionary predicates.
Note that predicting which predicates are discretionary and which are not
is beyond the scope of this work. I assume that doctor is not, and tasty is.
A more ambitious project would aim to predict which predicates are objective
and which are discretionary on the basis of their lexical semantic properties in
conjunction with philosophical stances on such things as the nature of rationality
and empirical evidence. Evidence that such a project is warranted comes from
the following pair of examples pointed out by Kennedy &Willer (2016), in which
that one and the same relation (‘part of’) has varying effects on the felicity of
consider:
(9) a. #Kim considers Burgundy part of France.
b. Kim considers Crimea part of Russia.
Somehow, whether Crimea is part of Russia is a matter of opinion, but whether
Burgundy is part of France is not. Assuming that the same notion of parthood
is involved in both variants, this example shows that the relation alone does
not determine the status of the proposition. I leave it to the ambitious project
to explain why worlds may have heterogeneous refinements with respect to the
question of whether Crimea is part of Russia, but not whether Burgundy is part
of France.
Truth at a world (or objective truth) can be defined as truth at all refinements
of the world. Likewise, falsity at a world is falsity at all refinements of the world.
More precisely, a formula φ is objectively true relative to context c and world
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w if and only if JφKc,o = T for all refinements o of w. Similarly, a formula φ is
objectively false relative to context c and world w if and only if JφKc,o = F for
all refinements o of w.
Setting aside the possibility of undefined values, an objective proposition is
either objectively true or objectively false at every world; their truth values are
always uniform across all refinements of a given world. Discretionary proposi-
tions have truth values that are heterogeneous across refinements of at least one
world, so a discretionary proposition will not always be true or false at a world.
However, it can happen that a discretionary proposition is false at a world. For
example, consider the proposition expressed by the following case, involving in-
tersective modification of a non-discretionary noun by a discretionary adjective:
(10) John is a sexy linguist.
Note first that the proposition expressed by this sentence is discretionary;
there are worlds with refinements where it is true (in which John is both sexy
and a linguist) and other refinements where it is false (in which John is a linguist,
but not sexy). However, the proposition expressed (10) is false at all refinements
of any world where John is not a linguist. So it is false at all such worlds. Such
‘hybrid’ propositions are (weakly) discretionary but not strongly discretionary.
3.2 Faultlessness
We now have the tools to characterize the notion of being ‘at fault’, in the
relevant sense for the discussion of ‘faultless disagreement’. The observation on
which this is based is the intuition that in a case like (3), neither participant
has said something false.
Whether or not one has said something false depends on which world one
is in. So being ‘at fault’ must be defined relative to a world. For this, we can
use the world determined by the context of utterance. (As discussed below, the
context of utterance is one part of the theory where I believe that the word
‘outlook’ should not replace the word ‘possible world’; contexts of utterance
should be conceived of as specifying a particular possible world in which the
utterance is taking place, rather than designating a particular outlook.) If
someone expresses a formula φ in context of utterance c, and φ is objectively
false with respect to c and the world of c, then that individual is at fault in the
relevant sense for doing so. Call a prohibition against being at fault in this way
the norm of accuracy.10
As discussed above, discretionary propositions are not in general false through-
out the refinement classes of worlds, and a strongly discretionary proposition is
never false throughout the refinement class of a world. Assuming that ‘tasty’
is independent of all objective predicates, it is strongly discretionary, so simple
predications involving it will also be. Under this assumption, any given world
10This characterization of fault diverges radically from that of Kölbel (2002). He says,
“One makes a mistake if one believes a proposition [or content] that is not true in one’s own
perspective (at that time)” (p. 100). On the present story, one cannot believe a proposition
that is not true in one’s own perspective, so such a situation would never arise.
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will have refinements o and o′ such that the chili is tasty in o and the chili is
not tasty in o′, so a simple predication of a discretionary predicate, as in The
chili is tasty, will not be false at any world. By the same token, The chili is
not tasty will never have world-level falsity. So no agent could ever be at fault
for expressing either one of these sentences. (In principle, if ‘tasty’ were dis-
cretionary but not strongly discretionary, there could be worlds at which The
chili is tasty is an assertion for which one could be at fault. I have difficulty
imagining such a scenario.)
Nevertheless, The chili is tasty clearly contradicts The chili is not tasty.
Again, two propositions are contradictory if there is no outlook verifying both
of them, i.e., if the intersection of the propositions they express is empty. If
we take a standard view on negation, then The chili is tasty contradicts This
chili is not tasty; the latter expresses the complement of the former in Ω. Let
us assume that the chili refers to some individual. Call that individual Mr.
Chili, and let us assume that tasty picks out a set of objects, relative to a given
outlook. The proposition expressed by A’s statement in the chili dialogue is the
set of outlooks where Mr. Chili is a member of the set picked out by tasty. The
proposition expressed by B’s statement is the set of outlooks where Mr. Chili is
not a member of the tasty set. There is no overlap between these propositions; no
outlook is in both. In other words, the two propositions cannot simultaneously
be satisfied. Hence we have a genuine contradiction between A’s statement and
B’s statement. Hence B’s ability to preface his response with No, signalling
contradiction in the chili dialogue in (3).
The same cannot be said about a case involving indexicals such as in the
doctor dialogue (6). In that case, we have different contexts of utterance for A’s
statement and B’s statement, because they involve different speakers. When A
is the speaker, I gets interpreted as A. So, relative to the context where A is the
speaker, A’s statement expresses the proposition that A is a doctor, the set of
outlooks where A is in the set picked out by doctor. When B is the speaker, I
gets interpreted as B. The proposition expressed by I am not a doctor, spoken
by B, is the set of outlooks where B is not in the set picked out by doctor.
These two propositions can be satisfied simultaneously. A being a doctor does
not preclude B not being a doctor, obviously. So there is no contradiction here
and No is inappropriate.
But as noted above, our definition of ‘discretionary’ allows for a situation in
which the refinements of a given world are uniform with respect to the (classical)
truth value of a given discretionary proposition (e.g. where the discretionary
proposition is false at all refinements of the world). All that is required for a
proposition to be discretionary is that it make a cut across the refinement class
of some world. This means that there could be some other world such that our
discretionary proposition p is, say, false at all of its refinements.
Take for example John is a sexy linguist. This is true at outlooks where
John is sexy and John is a linguist. Whether or not he is a linguist varies by
world; in some worlds he is a linguist and in others he is not, and that holds
for all refinements of the worlds in question. Among the refinements of worlds
where John is a linguist, the proposition makes a cut between those where he
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is sexy and those were he is not. But the proposition is uniformly false among
all refinements of worlds where John is not a linguist. This property comports
with the intuition that when John is a sexy linguist is uttered in a world where
John is not a linguist, the speaker has said something false. This intuition is
further supported by the following contrast.
(11) A: John is a sexy linguist.
B: No, he’s not sexy.
(12) A: John is a sexy linguist.
B: No, he’s not a linguist.
(11) has the character of a faultless disagreement, while (12) does not. Our
definitions deliver these results: A speaker would be at fault for saying that
John is a sexy linguist in a world where John is not a linguist, because the
sentence would be objectively false in that world.
3.3 Acceptance and disagreement
So far we have faultlessness and contradiction, so we have ‘faultless contradic-
tion’ as it were. But we do not yet have faultless disagreement. For that, we
need to build up some tools for talking about doxastic states. They will also be
of use in defining the semantics of subjective attitude verbs.
Because outlooks are ‘complete’, it is not tenable to associate each agent with
a single outlook; most of us are not so opinionated and headstrong. For example,
if A asks B what he thinks about the soup, B might respond ‘I don’t know
what I think’, signalling that he does not have a firm opinion. Following the
tradition in epistemic logic, where the epistemic state of an agent is represented
as a set of possible worlds, we will represent a doxastic state for an agent as
a set of outlooks. The set of outlooks compatible with the agent’s beliefs and
opinions are those that are doxastically accessible to the agent. Here the present
framework differs from that of Kölbel (2002), who associates each agent with a
single ‘perspective’. We might retain the use of the word ‘perpective’ to name
something that is uniquely associated with an agent, namely the agent’s doxastic
state, so we can speak of ‘the perspective of Anne’, or ‘Anne’s perpsective’. (It is
tempting, but incorrect, to speak of ‘the outlook of Anne’, or ‘Anne’s outlook’,
since this typically does not uniquely refer.) With this terminological choice, a
perspective is a set of outlooks.
To believe a proposition p, or be of the opinion that p holds, is to be in
a state such that every one of one’s doxastically accessible outlooks verifies
p. (This is the ordinary conception of belief in epistemic logic, with the word
‘world’ replaced by the word ‘outlook’.) In that case we can simply say that the
proposition holds according to the agent, or more simply, that the agent accepts
the proposition. If the chili is tasty in all of an agent’s doxastically accessible
outlooks, then the agent accepts the proposition that the chili is tasty (i.e., the
agent is of the opinion that the chili is tasty). If I am an opera singer in all
of the agent’s doxastically accessible outlooks, then the agent accepts (believes)
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the proposition that I am an opera singer. We could also speak in terms of
‘perspectives’ here; if a proposition holds according to an agent, it can be said
hold from the agent’s perspective (but not according to *the agent’s outlook;
again, this is not well-formed).
If the agent does not know whether I am an opera singer or not, then there
will be some outlooks in that agent’s doxastic state according to which I am an
opera singer, and others according to which I am not. Then the agent does not
accept the proposition that I am an opera singer. Likewise, if the agent has no
opinion on the chili, it will be tasty according to some of the agent’s doxastically
accessible outlooks and not tasty according to others. Then the agent does not
accept the proposition that the chili is tasty. This does not mean that the agent
rejects the proposition. If an agent rejects a proposition, then the proposition
holds in none of the agent’s doxastically accessible outlooks.
A precondition for disagreement between two agents is that one accepts a
proposition and the other rejects it. Furthermore, as MacFarlane (2007) points
out, it shouldn’t really count as a disagreement if you are in the world where I
am an opera singer, and you believe that I am an opera singer, and I am in the
actual world, and I believe that I am not an opera singer. Only world-mates
may sensibly disagree.
Thus in order to give a satisfactory account of agreement and disagreement,
we also have to take into consideration the fact that agents have different beliefs
and opinions under different circumstances. That someone happens to believe
something is a contingent matter, varying from world to world. Furthermore,
whether or not an agent has a given belief is a matter of fact, as shown by the
fact that one would use tro ‘believe’ rather than tycka ‘be of the opinion that’
when embedding a tycka-report:
(13) a. Jag tror att hon tycker att...
I believe that she thinks[opinion] that...
b. #Jag tycker att hon tycker att...
I think[opinion] that she believes that...
But even though it is a matter of fact, the proposition expressed by a belief
report can still be treated as a set of outlooks. Propositions about attitudes, like
all propositions, are sets of outlooks, whether they are matters of fact or opinion,
since outlooks settle both factual and discretionary matters. This means that
agents’ doxastic states vary from outlook to outlook. In different outlooks,
agents are in different doxastic states, in other words.
Making this assumption allows us to use standard tools from epistemic logic
to represent the variation in agents’ doxastic states across different circum-
stances within the outlook framework. In particular, we can capture variation
in doxastic state across outlooks via an accessibility relation Ra on Ω for each
agent a, and let the doxastic state of a according to a given outlook o be the
set of outlooks accessible via Ra from o. Suppose we have four outlooks, o11,
o10, o01, and o00, and two agents a and b. In o11, the chili is tasty and I am an
opera singer; in o10, the chili is tasty but I am not an opera singer; in o01, the
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Figure 2: Example model of accessibility relations among outlooks
chili is not tasty but I am an opera singer; and in o00 the chili is not tasty and
nor am I an opera singer. The diagram in Figure 2 illustrates a possible set of
accessibility relations among these outlooks: Each node is an outlook, and an
arrow from one outlook to another outlook, labelled with the name of an agent,
indicates that the target outlook is doxastically accessible to the agent from the
source outlook.
Let p = {o11, o10} be the proposition that the chili is tasty, and let q ={o11, o01} be the proposition that I am an opera singer. In o10 and o00, agent
a accepts p and rejects q, because the only outlook accessible to a is the one in
which both p and q hold. In those same two outlooks, agent b accepts p, because
all of the accessible outlooks are ones in which p holds, but b does not accept or
reject q; both possibilities for q are open. In o11 and o01, agent a accepts both
p and q, because the only outlook accessible to a is the one in which both p and
q hold. In those same two outlooks, agent b rejects p and accepts q.11
Disagreement may then be defined with respect to two agents and a propo-
sition at an outlook. If, at a given outlook o, one agent accepts p and another
rejects p, then the two agents disagree about p in o. So, in both o11 and o01,
agents a and b disagree about p but agree about q. Because acceptance and
rejection of propositions are objective matters, constant across refinements of a
given world, we can also speak derivatively of disagreement at a world.12
The distinction between contradiction and disagreement is useful for ac-
counting for the subtle difference between (6) and (7).. In the chili dialogue,
we have (faultless) contradiction and (faultless) disagreement. Contradiction is
lacking both in the doctor dialogue (6) and in the frog legs dialogue in (7), but
in the former case there is no disagreement, while in the latter case, there is a
11Note that p holds in o11 so there is a sense in which b is ‘wrong’ at this outlook. But
this does not mean that b is ‘at fault’ for the purposes of ‘faultless disagreement’, as we will
explain later.
12Overloading the term ‘faultless’ just the slightest bit, a disagreement at a world can be
said to be faultless if the proposition is false at at least one refinement of the world and true
at at least one other refinement.
15
disagreement.
The fact that there is no contradiction in (7) follows from the presence of the
indexical me in the phrase to me. We might analyze to me as a propositional
attitude operator (akin to ‘I think that...’), or as an argument to a binary
version of the predicate ‘taste good’. In either case, because we have a speaker-
indexical in the sentence and a change of speaker across the two utterances, the
two sentences will not end up expressing contradictory propositions. Hence the
inappropriateness of No here.
However, in a case like the frog legs dialogue, we do have disagreement, even
though we don’t have contradiction. We have disagreement in the sense that
A holds it to be the case that frog legs taste good, while B does not, given
a pragmatic assumption of sincerity. Let us assume that when one makes an
assertion expressing a discretionary proposition, one is being sincere if one holds
the opinion in question. Being sincere means adhering to the Maxim of Quality,
which can be stated as follows:
(14) Maxim of Quality
If p is the proposition expressed by sentence φ in Kaplanian context c,
then the agent should accept p in c.
Now, to make sense of this, we must say what it means to accept a proposition
in a context of utterance, and this part is slightly tricky. For Kaplan (1978), a
context of utterance is a sequence of parameters including not only a speaker
and an addressee, but also a world, which serves as a default circumstance of
evalution. In the present framework, circumstances of evaluation are outlooks,
so it is natural to assume that the context of utterance provides an outlook
rather than a world. However, I believe that this is one place where we do not
want to strike out the word ‘possible world’ and replace it with ‘outlook’. If it
were an outlook, which one would it be? There will be no single outlook that
captures the opinions of all of the interlocutors, and certainly no single outlook
that captures what has been agreed upon so far. On the other hand, it is easy to
determine which world should be provided by the context: the world in which
the conversation is taking place.
Letting the context provide a world rather than an outlook suffices for the
Maxim of Quality, which relies on the notion of acceptance in a context; since
acceptance is defined on worlds, we can see acceptance in a context as acceptance
in the world of the context. The world of the context can also serve as a default
circumstance of evaluation for objective propositions, for which truth at a world
is defined. So it seems to be both harmless and less problematic to assume that
the context of utterance determines a world.
Assuming that the interlocutors are being sincere in a case like (3), they
disagree in the world of the dialogue (the world common to the contexts of
both utterances). Recall the definition of disagreement: “If, at a given outlook
o, one agent accepts p and another rejects p, then the two agents disagree
about p in o. So, in both o11 and o01, agents a and b disagree about p but
agree about q.” In the frog legs dialogue, the interlocutors do not express
contradictory propositions, although they do give evidence of disagreement, by
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reporting on their own doxastic states. This can be used to explain why No is
slightly ameliorated in the frog legs dialogue, compared to the doctor dialogue:
For perfect felicity, no requires contradiction (as in the chili dialogue), but in the
absence of contradiction (as in the doctor dialogue and the frog legs dialogue),
disagreement ameliorates it.
Note that this treatment captures disagreement under attitude reports, so
John thinks that carrots are tasty and Mary thinks they’re not implies that John
and Mary disagree about the tastiness of carrots. To make this precise, let us
assume that, relative to a given context of utterance c, ‘a thinks φ’ is true at
an outlook o if and only if, in o, a accepts the proposition expressed by φ in
c. This means that every outlook accessible via Ra from o is one satisfying the
proposition expressed by φ in c. Given such a semantics for think (provided
in §3.5), this sentence denotes the set of outlooks where the proposition that
carrots are tasty holds according to John but not according to Mary.
To summarize, we now have faultless contradiction and disagreement. With
the notion of being ‘at fault’ as defined above, we have faultlessness for discre-
tionary claims that make a cut among refinements of the relevant world. We
also have genuine contradiction (because the ‘X is tasty’ and ‘X is not tasty’ ex-
press contradictory propositions) so we can account for the intuition that in the
chili dialogue, the parties have contradicted each other, and yet neither has said
something false. In this sense, we have what would more accurately be called
‘faultless contradiction’. We furthermore have disagreement (when one agent
accepts and another rejects the same proposition at the same world/outlook).
Putting this together with the Maxim of Quality, we obtain the conclusion that
the chili dialogue also involves what can genuinely be called ‘faultless disagree-
ment’.
3.4 Faultless disagreement in world-judge relativism
Several authors have argued that world-judge relativism does not actually de-
liver faultless contradiction (or disagreement). Stojanovic (2007), for example,
argues that relativism (as implemented by Lasersohn, etc.) does not actually
explain the ‘disagreement’ of ‘faultless disagreement’, based on the assumption
of semantic competence (SC): that speakers of English are semantically com-
petent with predicates of taste. Concerning a disagreement dialogue between
Tarek and Inma, she writes (p. 697):
Now, if Tarek intends the content that he is asserting to be evaluated
for truth at himself, and if Inma intends her content to be evaluated
for truth at herself, that will undermine the idea that their disagree-
ment is genuine and rational. Both of them, given SC, know that
one and the same content may take different truth values when eval-
uated at different judges. They also know that one’s assertion and
the other’s denial of the same content are inconsistent only when
evaluated with respect to the same judge. Hence if each party in-
tends the asserted content to be evaluated at himself or herself, and
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if this is mutually clear between them, then they will realize that
there is no clash in truth value between their claims (when evaluted
as they intend them to be), and that their “disagreement” is thus
nothing more than a divergence in preferences.
In other words, if we have faultlessness, then we can’t have genuine disagreement
at the same time. Faultlessness depends on having different intended judges, and
if we have different intended judges, then we’re not disagreeing. Other authors
have expressed similar doubts; these include Rosenkranz (2008), Moruzzi (2008),
Cappelen & Hawthorne (2009), and Moltmann (2010). To the extent that this
criticism holds water, world-judge relativism (as implemented by its proponents)
does not actually do what it sets out to do.
Although it is typically directed to relativism in general, this criticism only
applies to world-judge relativism, at least as put forth by its proponents. Sto-
janovic also says in footnote 3 that her critique of relativism applies to Kölbel’s
(2002) proposal as well, but does not explain why. As we have just seen in
detail, it does not apply to outlook-based semantics.
I must note that, as pointed out by a reviewer, an analogous move can be
made within the framework of world-judge relativism, although to my knowledge
this move has not been made. One can define subjective propositions as those
for which there are pairs ⟨w, j⟩ and ⟨w, j′⟩ such that j ≠ j′ and the proposition
is true according to the former and not the latter (judge-variant propositions,
as opposed to judge-invariant propositions, in Sæbø’s (2009) terminology), and
maintain the idea that only objective propositions are subject to the norm of
accuracy. So there is in fact a way to address Stojanovic’s criticism within the
technical bounds of world-judge relativism.
Note that in order to make this work, it would be important to make sure
that the model includes a fully-opinionated judge for every possible combination
of opinions, so as to avoid the consequence that certain combinations of opinions
are ruled out by necessity. This means that the set of agents in the model must
be expanded beyond what we have independent reason to posit. It is also not
clear whether this maintains the spirit of world-judge relativism. The idea
behind world-judge relativism seems to be that something can be ‘true for you’
but not ‘true for me’, which leads naturally to an approach to faultlessness where
the applicability of a statement is restricted to a certain judge or standard (or
set thereof). The assumption that a discretionary statement represents oneself,
or the agent whose perspective one is taking, seems integral to the philosophical
motivation for world-judge relativism.
3.5 Subjective attitude verbs
Now let us return to subjective attitude verbs. As we have seen, the distri-
bution of tycka is narrower than that of English think, favoring discretionary
predicates. This sensitivity can be implemented in outlook-based semantics
straightforwardly, as §3.5.1 will show. In §3.5.2 I argue that world-judge rela-
tivist approaches have problematic consequences that outlook-based semantics
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avoids.
3.5.1 Subjective attitude verbs in outlook-based semantics
Before giving a formal treatment of subjective attitude verbs, let us consider
more carefully what precisely the condition on tycka is. The data we have
considered so far can be captured using the following simple generalization:
tycka may take a given clause as its complement if and only if the proposition
the clause expresses is discretionary. Another imaginable hypothesis is that
tycka requires its complement to be strongly discretionary. On the face of it,
the following example would seem to argue for the former, as it suggests that
‘hybrids’, which are objectively false at some worlds, can be embedded under
tycka:
(15) Ebba tycker att Jonas är en sexig lingvist.
‘Ebba thinks[opinion] that Jonas is a sexy linguist.’
However (as a reviewer points out), this example is only fully acceptable in a
context where it is taken as given that Jonas is a linguist. We can see this if we
negate the sentence or ask it as a question:
(16) Ebba tycker inte att Jonas är en sexig lingvist.
‘Ebba doesn’t think[opinion] that Jonas is a sexy linguist.’
(17) Tycker Ebba att Jonas är en sexig lingvist?
‘Does Ebba think[opinion] that Jonas is a sexy linguist?’
All of these imply that Jonas is a linguist. A similar observation is made by
Bouchard (2012b) for find. With reference to examples such as (18), Bouchard
writes that “the non-subjective component of the complement clause is presup-
posed, not asserted”.
(18) John finds that Mike gave a great class yesterday.
As Bouchard demonstrates using ordinary projection tests, the implication that
Mike gave a class yesterday projects. Obligatory projection of the non-subjective
content can be understood under the following assumption:
(19) Condition on felicitous use of tycka
Relative to the common ground, the complement of tyckamust be strongly
discretionary.
What this means exactly will be spelled out in more detail below, but the idea
is that any non-discretionary content should be presupposed.
Further support for the correctness of (19) comes from coordination. A ver-
sion of (17) with the discretionary and non-discretionary components separated
out into individual conjuncts is not acceptable:
(20) #Ebba tycker att Jonas är sexig och en lingvist.
‘Ebba thinks[opinion] that Jonas is a sexy and a linguist.’
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This is of the same structure as Sæbø’s (2009, 338) conjunctive example:
(21) #She finds him handome and below 45.
(See also Fleisher (2013) and Hirvonen (2014) for discussion of this example.)
Sæbø (2009) accounts for this in terms of a type clash. Such a treatment
is not available in outlook-based semantics, because discretionary and non-
discretionary propositions are of the same semantic type here: both are sets
of outlooks. The fact that such a route is not available in the present frame-
work might be seen as an advantage, however, given the combinability of discre-
tionary and non-discretionary predicates in intersective modification cases like
the ‘sexy linguist’ example. But an account in terms of presupposition appears
viable. Note that generally, the content contributed by a conjunct may not be
presupposed. Consider the following contrast:
(22) He is a linguist. And he is a sexy linguist.
(23) He is a linguist. #And he is sexy, and (he is) a linguist.
If there is a general ban on individual conjuncts contributing solely presupposed
material, then doing so will lead to a clash.
Kennedy & Willer (2016, 12) explain the unacceptability of examples like
(21) using the assumption that “the complement of an attitude ascription not
only expresses a proposition but also highlights a set of issues,” and that sub-
jective attitude verbs presuppose that each of the issues raised by the prejacent
are discretionary. As they point out, this idea also sheds light on the following
contrast, noted for Norwegian synes by Sæbø (2009):
(24) Hon tycker att alla rökare är otrevliga.
‘She thinks[opinion] that all smokers are unpleasant.’
(25) #Hon tycker att alla som är trevliga är icke-rökare.
‘She thinks[opinion] that everyone who is pleasant is a non-smokers.’
Kennedy & Willer (2016) discuss the following variant of this contrast:
(26) Kim finds everyone who is not vegetarian unpleasant.
(27) #Kim finds everyone who is pleasant vegetarian.
As they put it, given the “reasonable assumption” that ‘everyone who is not
vegetarian is unpleasant’ and ‘everyone who pleasant is vegetarian’ are equiva-
lent, they should be equally embeddable under find under any account that is
sensitive only to the nature of the proposition expressed by the complement.
Kennedy & Willer (2016) point out that their account in terms of the issues
raised by the prejacent offers a uniform explanation for the coordination case
and the quantification case, in contrast to Sæbø’s (2009) solution in terms of
Quantifier Raising, which only applies to the quantification case. Kennedy and
Willer offer a formal implementation on which:
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• an atomic formula raises the issue corresponding to the question formed
by abstracting over any free variables it contains;
• the set of issues raised by a sentence of the form φ ∧ψ is the union of the
issues raised by φ and ψ individually; and
• the set of issues raised by a quantificational sentence of the form Q(φ,ψ)
is the set of issues raised by ψ.
They formulate these principles in terms of a logical language, using ∧ rather
than natural language and, among other symbols not found in natural language.
This raises the question of how to handle intersective modification. Assuming
an intersective interpretation, a logical representation for John is a sexy linguist
presumably involves logical and (∧). And yet this sentence ostensibly does not
raise the issue of whether John is a linguist, given that it can be embedded under
tycka. This seems to show that the formula for computing the issues raised must
make reference to natural language and, rather than logical and. So what seems
to be needed is a refinement of the Kennedy/Willer account which defines the
issues raised more in terms of the natural language structure. (This would
take us into the realm of articulating a theory of Gricean manner, a generally
underexplored area.) I will not an attempt such a theory here. But given such
a theory, the coordination case can be explained through the interaction of the
following principles:
1. The complement of tycka must be strongly discretionary relative to the
common ground.
2. Each natural language conjunct (typically) raises its own issue.
3. It is inappropriate to raise an issue that is already settled in the com-
mon ground (cf. Groenendijk & Roelofsen’s (2009) Maxim of Inquisitive
Sincerity).
With the ‘handsome and below 45’ example (21), the second principle will re-
quire that the ‘over 45’ conjunct raises the issue of whether the man in question
is over 45. The third principle then requires that this issue is not settled in
the common ground. Against the background of such a common ground, the
proposition expressed by the complement of the subjective attitude verb will
not be strongly discretionary. Hence a crash.
Of these three requirements, I will only formalize the first here. Before
getting to the notion of being discretionary relative to an information state such
as the common ground, let us first introduce presupposition. The subjectivity
requirement of tycka, like other selectional requirements, is natural to see as a
presupposition. Indeed, this requirement behaves as a presupposition, surviving
negation and other entailment-cancelling operators.
(28) #Jag tycker inte att det är tisdag idag.
‘I don’t think[opinion] it’s Tuesday today’
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(29) #Om du tycker att det är tisdag idag, så har du fel.
If you think[opinion] it’s Tuesday today, then you’re wrong.
Assuming that presupposition failure implies that the sentence lacks a classical
truth value, ‘a tycker φ’ has a classical truth value only in those contexts where
φ expresses a strongly discretionary proposition.13 Where defined, it is then
true at an outlook only if a accepts φ at that outlook.14
Since we have introduced the notion of presupposition, we must adjust our
definitions of proposition and what it means to express a discretionary propo-
sition. As hinted earlier, we will now treat a proposition as a function from
outlooks to truth values, where the truth values may include T, F, and m.
The proposition expressed by φ in context c is that function f from outlooks to
truth values such that for all outlooks o, f(o) = JφKc;o. Then we need to redefine
the notion of discretionary with this complication in mind. A proposition that
assigns o to T and o′ to F where o and o′ are refinements of the same world
surely must be considered discretionary. In fact, that is all we need to say.
Discretionary propositions assign heterogeneous classical truth values within a
refinement class; objective propositions assign homogenous classical truth values
within a refinement class.
Officially, we have the following revised definitions (against the background
of a set of worldsW and a set of outlooks Ω and a one-to-one relation ∝ between
worlds and their refinement classes):
• Proposition (revised)
A proposition is a (total) function from outlooks to truth values.
13This analysis implies that whether or not a given statement counts as discretionary is
something that holds or not according to an outlook. According to the non-ambitious way
of distinguishing between objective and discretionary, a given statement is necessarily either
objective or discretionary, i.e. one way or the other at every outlook, given a model. But it
is not clear to me that the very discretionariness of a statement is a matter of fact; rather, I
suspect that there may be room for reasonable disagreement in some cases. Indeed, we find:
Jag tycker inte/fortfarande att det är en åsiktsfråga. ‘It is not/still my opinion that this is a
matter of opinion.’
14The Swedish verb tro ‘believe’, I believe, presupposes that its complement is non-
discretionary. Prima facie this would predict non-overlap in the distribution of tycka and
tro, but in fact they are both acceptable in many cases:
(1) Jag tror/tycker att soppan är god.
‘I believe/think[opinion] that the soup is good.’
(2) Jag tror/tycker att det är viktigt.
‘I believe/think[opinion] that it is important.’
I would like to claim that cases of overlap between tro and tycka can be due either to coercion or
ambiguity. The former case is exemplified by (1), where the complement gets coerced into an
objective interpretation like The soup is good according to people in general. But according
to people in general is not always how apparently discretionary predicates are interpreted
under tro. In cases like (2), the choice appears to depend on whether importance is treated
as discretionary or non-discretionary. That X is important for Y can be seen as an objective,
scientific claim, rather than a statement of opinion: that it has a predictable impact on
Y. So viktigt is a vague predicate that can be construed either as discretionary or as non-
discretionary.
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• Objective proposition (revised)
A proposition p is objective if there is no w ∈ W such that there are
refinements o, o′ ∈ Ω of w such that p(o) = T and p(o′) = F.
• Discretionary proposition (revised)
A proposition p is discretionary iff there is some w ∈ W such that there
are refinements o, o′ ∈ Ω of w and p(o) = T and p(o′) = F.
• Strongly discretionary proposition (revised)
A proposition p is strongly discretionary iff for all w ∈W, there are refine-
ments o, o′ ∈ Ω of w such that p(o) = T and p(o′) = F.
Against the background of these revised notions, let us now define the notion
of being objective or discretionary relative to a given information state, such as
the common ground:
• Information state
An information state is a set of outlooks.
• C-restricted refinement class
Where C is an information state, the C-restricted refinement class of a
world w, written w ↾ C, is the set of outlooks in C that are refinements of
w.
• Objective relative to an information state
A proposition p is objective relative to an information state C iff there is
no w such that o, o′ ∈ w ↾ C and p(o) = T and p(o′) = F.
• Discretionary relative to an information state
A proposition p is discretionary relative to an information state C iff there
is some w such that o, o′ ∈ w ↾ C and p(o) = T and p(o′) = F.
• Strongly discretionary relative to an information state
A proposition p is strongly discretionary relative to an information state
C iff for all w such that w ↾ C is non-empty, there are o, o′ ∈ w ↾ C such
that p(o) = T and p(o′) = F.
Thus, relative to an information state, a strongly discretionary proposition
makes a cut within all of the worlds that are not ruled out by that information
state.
One further technical assumption is necessary in order to implement the re-
quirement that the complement of tycka be strongly discretionary relative to
the common ground, because our formal system must have access to the com-
mon ground as a whole. The presupposition to be encoded is not a pointwise
requirement on each of the worlds in the common ground; the property of dis-
cretionariness can only be evaluated via quantification over the whole set of
outlooks. Hence, evaluation of the truth and definedness conditions cannot be
carried out in a standard static framework that evaluates truth relative to a
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single point of evaluation. Therefore, emboldened by Stalnaker’s (2014) encour-
agement to do so, I will henceforth use the common ground as an additional
parameter of evalution.
The fragment in §5 defines a formal language in which the extension of an
expression is determined in relation to a model M , a context of utterance c, a
context set C, an assignment g, and an outlook o. The model M determines
among other things a set of outlooks Ω, a set of worlds W , and a relation ∝
between them which determines which outlooks are refinements of which worlds.
The proposition expressed by φ (or intension of φ) relative to M , c, C, and g,
written JφKM,c,C,g¢ is that function f such that for all o ∈ Ω, f(o) = JφKM,c,C,g,o.
Relative to M , c, C, and g, what tycka requires of its complement φ is that
the proposition JφKM,c,C,g¢ is strongly discretionary relative to C. The formal
language contains a constant encapsulating this notion:
(30) Jdiscretionary(φ)KM,c,C,g,o = T iff JφKM,c,C,g¢ is strongly discretionary
relative to C
The formal language also includes ◻ and ◇ operators parameterized by an
agent, capturing modal necessity and possibility in relation to the agent’s dox-
astic accessibility relation. Thus if α denotes agent a, then ◻αφ means that φ
holds in all of a’s doxastically accessible outlooks; that is, a accepts the proposi-
tion expressed by φ (in the relevant context of utterance), in the technical sense
defined above. Both English think and Swedish tycka are translated into the
formal language (indicated by ↝) using the ◻-operator; the only difference is
that tycka incorporates a discretionariness presupposition. The system (whose
compositional details are given in §5) derives the following translations:
(31) α thinks φ ↝ [◻α′[φ′]]
(32) α tycker φ ↝ [∂(discretionary(φ′)) ∧ ◻α′[φ′]]
where α′ is the translation of α and φ′ is the translation of φ. The ∂ operator
seen in these lexical postulates delivers ‘undefined’ if its complement is not
true, and the logic is defined in such a way that conjoining a formula with an
undefined truth value with any other formula yields a formula with an undefined
truth value, so the inference typically projects. (See Beaver & Krahmer 2001.)
A sentence containing the verb tycka will thus typically be undefined unless its
complement is discretionary in the required way.15
A natural question that arises now is what happens in case the complement
itself contains a presupposition. Take the following example (suggested by a
reviewer):
(33) Jag tycker att det är förjävligt att han dumpat henne.
‘I think[opinion] it’s terrible that he dumped her.’
15There is some evidence that this presupposition can be filtered: Om det är en åsiktsfråga,
så tycker jag att det är osannolikt. ‘If it’s a matter of opinion, then I think[opinion] that it’s
unlikely.’
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is defined only with respect to those outlooks where he dumped her. (That
set corresponds to an objective proposition.) Among the remaining ones, it
crosscuts the worlds. Thus in this case it is correctly predicted that the example
is felicitous.
Examples in which the ordinary semantic content is objective and a subjec-
tive proposition is presupposed behave like objective statements.
(34) Jag tror/#tycker att hon inte bryr sig att han är en idiot.
‘I believe/think[opinion] that she doesn’t care that he is an idiot.’
This is correctly predicted by the theory. Although the set of outlooks for
which the proposition is defined cuts across world boundaries, there are no two
refinements of the same world such that the proposition is true at one and false
at the other.
Before moving on, let us briefly consider the contrast between find and con-
sider. Kennedy & Willer (2016) note that both find and consider are subjective
attitude verbs, as evidenced by the following contrasts:
(35) #Kim { findsconsiders } the sum of two and two equal to four.
(36) Kim { findsconsiders } Lee fascinating, because he is an expert on oysters.
However, they differ in their distribution as well:
(37) Kim {#findsconsiders } Lee vegetarian,
because the only animals he eats are oysters.
Kennedy & Willer (2016) put this forth as a problem for outlook-based se-
mantics, as no distinction is made here between different types of subjective
attitudes. But of course the framework is not in principle incompatible with
the possibility that different verbs impose different requirements on their com-
plement above and beyond being discretionary. Furthermore, a solution to the
problem that is parallel in structure to Kennedy and Willer’s is available in this
framework. Kennedy and Willer propose that find is radically counterstance-
contingent, which in the present framework translates as strongly discretionary,
while consider is merely counterstance-contingent, i.e., merely discretionary. I
consider it an open question what exactly the difference between find and con-
sider is, but the framework does not appear to me to be any less suited to an
account of it than Kennedy and Willer’s.
3.5.2 Subjective attitude verbs in world-judge relativism
Let us now compare this to treatments of subjective attitude verbs in world-
judge relativism. There are (at least) two different kinds of treatments, one
which makes reference to a doxastic accessibility relation involving centered
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worlds where the centers are judges (Stephenson, 2007b,a; Lasersohn, 2009), and
another involving ‘radical judge shift’ (Sæbø, 2009; Bouchard, 2012a; Bylinina,
in press).
An example in the former category builds on Stephenson’s (2007a) analysis
of think, which implements a Lewisian account of de se belief (Lewis, 1979).
(See Lasersohn 2009, among others, for a similar proposal.) Abstracting away
from the time parameter of the index, this account relies on the assumption that
agents have a range of doxastically accessible centered worlds, where a centered
world determines both a possible world and an agent standing at the center of
the world. For a centered world ⟨w′, x′⟩ to be doxastically accessible to x in w
is for x in w′ to consider it possible that he might be x′ in w′. Which centered
worlds are doxastically accessible depends on which centered world one is in;
for any given pair ⟨w,x⟩ there is a set of centered worlds doxastically accessible
to x at w (the set of pairs ⟨x′,w′⟩ such that x believes x might be x′ in w′).
The proposition expressed by ‘a thinks φ’, where φ denotes a centered worlds
proposition, is the set of centered worlds ⟨w, j⟩ such that every centered world
doxastically accessible from ⟨w,a⟩ is one where φ holds. In the application of
centered worlds to predicates of personal taste, the agent component plays the
role of the judge for matters of opinion.
The restriction of subjective attitude verbs to discretionary contents may
then be implemented as a separate constraint. One natural possibility would
be to stipulate that subjective attitude verbs require the content to be a non-
constant function from judges. Stephenson actually advocates a different so-
lution. As Sæbø writes (p. 334), “while Stephenson does not treat find in her
paper (2007), in her dissertation (2007a) she does. Here, she suggests that this
verb differs from think in the extra requirement that the subject have direct ex-
perience of the argument proposition.” Sæbø criticizes this treatment, pointing
out that on this analysis, “[Homer finds himself gay] should be good, as Homer
can have the most direct evidence possible of his own sexual orientation.”
Although he ultimately argues against relativism in favor of a kind of contex-
tualism, Sæbø (2009) sketches an alternative world-judge relativist treatment of
Norwegian synes along the following lines: a synes φ, where φ is evaluated with
respect to both a world and a judge, is true with respect to w and j if and only
if φ is true with respect to w and a. According to this approach, the reason
synes cannot be used with objective propositions such as ‘dinosaurs are extinct’
is that “the whole attitude is redundant”. Because objective propositions are
judge-invariant, the embedded clause expresses the same proposition as the ma-
trix clause. As Bouchard (2012a, 164) points out, “[w]e would... need a theory of
how redundancy can make sentences infelicitous, under which conditions it does,
etc., before we can use this property to exclude [uses of subjective attitude verbs
with non-discretionary complements].” Bouchard (2012a) nevertheless gives a
variation on this account involving a presupposition of all non-subjective infor-
mation in the complement clause.16 His explanation also appeals to a slightly
16A detailed critique of Bouchard’s approach would take us too far astray, but I think that
there are counterexamples to his generalization that the non-subjective part of the complement
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different kind of redundancy: “every sentence where the complement of find is
not a subjective statement will have as its assertion exactly the same proposition
as its presupposition” (p. 168).
A problem that all of these world-judge relativist treatments of subjective
attitude verbs share derives from the fact that judges are totally opinionated.
This means that the following example is predicted to be self-contradictory:
(38) Det är inte så att jag tycker att det är viktigt, men jag tycker inte att
det inte är viktigt heller.
‘It’s not the case that I’m of the opinion that it’s important, but I’m
not of the opinion that it’s not important.’
This is not contradictory, because real-life human beings are sometimes not
opinionated. Under a Sæbø or Bouchard-style account, which does not appeal
to a doxastic accessibility relation, (38) would be analyzed as follows. Let φ
stand for det är viktigt ‘it’s important’ and ¬φ for its negation. Jag tycker
att det är viktigt ‘I am of the opinion that it is important’ denotes the set of
world-judge pairs ⟨w, j⟩ such that φ holds according to ⟨w, sp⟩, where sp is the
speaker. The negation would be the complement of that set, those world-judge
pairs such that φ does not hold according to the speaker in the world. Jag tycker
att det inte är viktigt ‘I am of the opinion that it is not important’ denotes the
set of world-judge pairs ⟨w, j⟩ such that ¬φ holds according to ⟨w, sp⟩, and the
negation would be the complement of that set, those world-judge pairs where φ
holds according to the speaker in the world. Since for every pair ⟨w, j⟩ either φ
holds or ¬φ holds but not both, the two clauses contradict each other.
A Stephenson-style approach stands a better chance. We can model lack of
opinionatedness through the doxastic accessibility relation, and say that if, at
a centered world ⟨w,x⟩, x isn’t of the opinion that φ but isn’t of the opinion
that ¬φ, then there are doxastically accessible worlds ⟨w′, x′⟩ and ⟨w′′, x′′⟩ such
that φ holds at ⟨w′, x′⟩ and ¬φ at ⟨w′′, x′′⟩. But there is still a problem: Lack
of opinionatedness entails either that one doesn’t know which world one is in
or that one doesn’t know which individual one is. Recall that for a centered
world ⟨w′, x′⟩ to be doxastically accessible to x in w is for x in w′ to consider it
possible that he might be x′ in w′. In principle, it is conceivable that one has
perfect knowledge of the facts, and still has no opinion on some issue. Yet on this
kind of centered worlds approach, this would mean that lack of opinionatedness
would entail imperfect knowledge of one’s identity.
Now, one might reinterpret these judges as abstract “stances”, rather than
particular individuals. This would bring the world-judge relativist treatment
much closer to the account advocated here. Indeed, an outlook can be de-
termined by a pair consisting of a world and an additional element on which
the extensions of all discretionary predicates depends. This could be called a
“judge”. But under such an interpretation of “judge”, it would no longer be pos-
sible to treat, for example, proper names like John or implicit personal pronouns
clause is presupposed. To paraphrase Hillary Clinton: “Donald Trump thinks he has great
ideas. I don’t think he even has ideas.”
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as potentially judge-denoting expressions, so the system would have to undergo
non-trivial revisions.
Outlook-based semantics offers a simple framework in which the required
revisions are already implemented. Lack of opinionatedness in outlook-based
semantics is parallel to lack of belief in a formula or its negation in epistemic
logic: If an agent is not opinionated with respect to φ, then there is one accessible
outlook for the agent where φ holds, and another one where φ does not hold.
4 Pragmatics
Stalnaker (1978, 85) wrote that “to engage in conversation is, essentially, to
distinguish among alternative possible ways that things may be”. This idea is
still current today. Roberts (1996), for example, developing an influntial model
of discourse based on Questions Under Discussion extended by Büring (2003)
and Farkas & Bruce (2010), among others, takes this idea and suggests that
the great overarching question by which all discourse is guided is “What’s up?”
(i.e., “What is the way the world is?”).
Yet this idea is plainly false (like many idealizations in science). The ques-
tions that we discuss (to the extent that we discuss questions) do not always
concern the alternative possible ways that the actual world may be. Meeting
a colleague accidentally on the train after a talk recently, filling time as the
train entered the station, I said, “That talk was very interesting today!” The
purpose of this remark was not to inform my colleague (very much my senior)
that the talk was interesting. It was not helping her locate the actual world
within epistemic space. It was an invitation to establish common ground, not
in the strict Stalnakerian sense—in a more colloquial sense—but a sense that I
will nevertheless formalize in a strictly Stalnakerian manner.
Egan (2010, 10-11) puts the point more eloquently and colorfully.
One very major role that aesthetic discourse plays is a sort of
connection-building role, in which people discover commalities in
the sorts of things that they enjoy, appreciate, or despise. This
can be a substantial part of the process of building and maintaining
relationships, and in establishing and maintaining ties to communi-
ties and groups. Very many groups and subcultures are defined, at
least in part, by the common aesthetic sensibilities of their members
(and the contrast between their shared aestheic sensibilities of their
outsiders). Think of, for example, such subcultures as goths, punk
rockers, ravers, trekkies, bikers, and so on.
I propose that we should think of this effect of successful aes-
thetic assertions, and successful resolutions of aesthetic disputes, of
inducing mutual self-attribution of certain dispositions to have a
particular sort of response to a particular (kind of) object, as the
central business of assertions and disputes about taste, and not as a
mere side effect.
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Relativism (both of Egan’s variety and the kind to be advocated here) helps to
explain the connection-building (and breaking) role of conversation. It implies
that the big question is not “What’s up?” but rather something more like, “How
do we see things?” In other words, as Egan (2010) puts it, the participants are
“trying to align their world views, not only with regard to factual beliefs [...],
but also with regard to subjective matters such as what is tasty”.
It goes along with this view that to assert a discretionary proposition is
to make a proposal for the whole group of interlocutors to take up. So stating
one’s opinion by saying ‘I think φ’ is quite different, pragmatically, than directly
asserting φ. The latter is a proposal that φ go in the common ground. Such
a proposal will only be successful if one can get one’s interlocutors to go along
with it. Here is an example where bald ‘φ’ is safe, so to speak:17
(39) F: We take the next one
A: Yes, this is not so good either
B: Here we have a good example of bad music then
A: But this is really bad music
B: Yes this is bad music
In the following case, consensus is not likely to be formed around φ, and the
form using a hedge is used instead.
(40) F: Is this something you like?
A: It’s bloody good music actually
B: [LAUGHS] I don’t think it’s that good. I don’t think that there’s
any melody really, to dig to.
It would have been quite different if B had said, “It’s not that good,” without
a hedge. In that case, B would not only have been rejecting A’s proposal, but
also making a counter-proposal to put the opposite proposition into the common
ground. The only way for that to work would be for A to change his mind or
defer to B’s authority.
In case of a power difference between the interlocutors, it may be that what
goes in the common ground is actually in conflict with one participant’s outlook.
It might even be public that one of the participants does not share the opinion
in question, but still goes along with it. In a conversation with Kim Jong
Un, for example, one would normally allow his opinions to go on record as the
final word, regardless of what one thinks oneself. To say No, φ! might be fine
among friends, or when it is clear that resolving the issue does not have high
stakes, or when one is taking a position that is flattering to the interlocutor or
self-deprecating, as in the following cases:
(41) Mr-BREHIER: Here we go. Wait until you taste that. Now we can serve
it plain like that or with an old chutney made with pecans, cilantro. It’s
a little hot, huh?
APPLEGATE: No, it’s wonderful.
17Examples and observation from Blomqvist (2014), originally in Swedish, from a led group
discussion with teenagers about their tastes in music.
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(42) A: Why? Why would you do that?
B: Because I didn’t wanna be ugly anymore.
A: Oh, baby. You’re not ugly.
B: Yes, I am. I know you don’t think so, but I am.
But otherwise, to contradict a discretionary assertion requires a certain amount
of chutzpah. One is not just making an assertion about one’s own tastes; one is
making a proposal that is going to count for the whole group.
There are some apparent exceptions. Pearson (2013, 118) argues that “[an]
agent’s tastes are relevant unless something about the context renders them
irrelevant—not having tasted the item, perhaps, or not being among its ‘target
audience’.” For example, consider Pearson’s (31a) and (32):
(43) a. #The cake must be tasty, but I wouldn’t like it.
b. The cake must be tasty, but I wouldn’t like it because I don’t like
chocolate.
The speaker’s unusual tastes seem to render her tastes irrelevant to whether the
cake is tasty. In such a case, however, the speaker would presumably nevertheless
be “disposed to act as if he assumes or believes that the proposition is true,”
as Stalnaker (1978, p. 84) puts it. So it still becomes common ground, and a
commitment of the speaker, that the cake is tasty in such a case (assuming this
is an entailment of The cake must be tasty).
Another fact supporting Pearson’s generalization is the contrast between
(44) and (45).
(44) Mary thinks that John thinks that the cake is tasty.
(45) The cat thinks that John thinks that the cat food is tasty.
In (44), we get a clear implication that the cake is tasty to John, whereas (45)
could be used to describe a situation in which John keeps buying a certain kind
of cat food for his cat, leading the cat to form the belief that John believes that
the cat food is tasty to the cat, but does not, of course, enjoy eating the cat
food himself. Being a human, rather than a cat, John’s tastes are not relevant
to whether the cat food is tasty. Interestingly, (45) would have to be translated
with tro ‘believe’ rather than tycka into Swedish:
(46) a. Katten tror att John tror att kattmaten är god.
b. #Katten tror att John tycker att kattmaten är god.
The version with tycka, (46b) clearly implies that John has tasted and enjoys the
cat food. This suggests that in (45), the embedded sentence is not interpreted
as a discretionary proposition, and has undergone some kind of coercion to an
objective proposition, perhaps about the cat’s tastes. I therefore do not believe
that these cases a problematic for the view that discretionary assertions concern
the whole group of interlocutors, insofar as they commit the participants to
being disposed to act as if they assume or believe that the proposition is true.
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So, whenever φ is interpreted as expressing a discretionary proposition, as-
serting φ constitutes a proposal to enter the proposition it expresses into com-
mon ground, and this requires acceptance by all interlocutors. In this respect
bare φ differs from ‘I think[opinion] that φ’. The group-relevance of φ is clearly
not captured by a simple-minded contextualist view, on which bare φ is equiva-
lent to ‘I think that φ’. World-judge relativists have provided accounts for this
fact, these accounts are problematic in a way that outlook-based semantics is
not, as I will argue presently.
Within a world-judge relativist framework, Stephenson (2007a) implements
the idea that conversation is about word-view alignment, although in a slightly
problematic way. Under Stalnaker’s view, the context set is a set of possible
worlds. This follows from thinking of possible worlds as the circumstances of
evaluation for a sentence. In world-judge relativism, the circumstances of evalua-
tion are world-judge pairs, or world-time-judge triples. Accordingly, Stephenson
(2007a) proposes to “[...] treat the context set as a set of world-time-judge triples
instead of worlds or world-time pairs” (p. 509). She then stipulates that “for all
the triples in the context set for a conversation, the judge element represents
the plurality of the group of participants in the conversation.”
But in that case, we might as well leave out the judge from the elements of
the context set, and just have a set of possible worlds, since the judge element is
not informative. Why do we have a semantics allowing for different judges, if it
is always taken for granted that the only judge in the universe of possible judges
is the plurality consisting of the conversational participants? Schaffer (2011, p.
182) makes a similar point: “If all the propositions of interest are perspective-
specific, then adding a perspective coordinate into truth evaluation will do no
work.”
The same criticism applies to Egan’s (2007) proposal, where the context set
is construed as a set of world-judge pairs just as under Stephenson’s treatment,
and the idea that sentences express sets of world-judge pairs is considered. Egan
shows that the only such assertions that do not have a tragic effect on the context
set (a technical notion describing an undesirable effect, where individual judges
are left “stranded” apart from the worlds that they in fact occupy) are ones for
which there is a certain presupposition of similarity among the participants with
respect to the proposition expressed by the sentence. He surmises that such a
presupposition is almost always in place for epistemic might sentences, which
he takes to express a set of world-judge pairs.18
The group-relevance of discretionary assertions follows automatically from
a very simple and standard model of discourse. In a nutshell, we are seeking
a common outlook. We capture the group-relevance of discretionary assertions
essentially by taking the received Stalnakerian view on presupposition and asser-
tion and replacing the word “possible world” with the word “outlook”. Following
Stalnaker (1978, 84), we can say that a proposition is presupposed if and only
if it is common ground among the participants in the conversation:
18Ninan (2010) discusses another approach to the problem, which goes beyond the frame-
work of world-judge relativism. I leave a systematic comparison of outlook-based semantics
to Ninan’s framework for future work.
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A proposition is presupposed if the speaker is disposed to act as
if he assumes or believes that the proposition is true, and as if he
assumes or believes that his audience assumes or believes that it is
true as well. Presuppositions are what is taken by the speaker to be
the common ground of the participants in the conversation[.]
Furthermore, if a proposition is presupposed then it holds according to every
element of the context set.19
Regall that under Stalnaker’s view, the context set is a set of possible worlds
and that this follows from thinking of possible worlds as the circumstances of
evaluation for a sentence. In this outlook-based framework, the context set is
a set of outlooks. The elements of the context set are viewed by Stalnaker as
the live options as to where the actual world might lie according to the conver-
sational participants. Here things are different: There is no ‘actual outlook’,
because there is no privileged answer to the question of whether frog legs actu-
ally are tasty. Since there is no ‘actual outlook’, we must think of the context
set slightly differently in the present setting, perhaps as the live options as to
a common outlook. The essential purpose of a converation becomes then, in a
sense, to find a common outlook.
Assertion may also be thought of in a Stalnakerian way. Stalnaker (1978,
86) says that the essential effect of an assertion is to reduce the context set in
a particular way.
To make an assertion is to reduce the context set in a particular way,
provided that there are no objections from the other participants in
the conversation. The particular way in which the context set is
reduced is that all of the possible situations incompatible with what
is said are eliminated. [...] This effect is avoided only if the assertion
is rejected.
Following Clark & Schaefer (1989), Clark (1992), Ginzburg (1996, 2012), Farkas
& Bruce (2010), and many others, let us make a slight refinement to this (or-
thogonal to the use of outlooks) in order to clearly distinguish between the
actual making of the assertion and its successful uptake, and say that to as-
sert a proposition is to make a certain kind of proposal, namely a proposal to
reduce the context set so that everything incompatible with the proposition is
eliminated. We may then say that an assertion is successful if the proposal is
accepted and the context set is reduced in this way.
If the proposal is accepted, then the assertion becomes common ground.
This means that all participants in the conversation are publicly committed to
it. Now, because an assertion reduces the context set so that the content of
19Note that there is an important difference between the context set and the context of
utterance. The context set is a set of circumstances of evaluation, representing the common
information or shared assumptions, while the context of utterance specifies parameters about
the here and now of the utterance, such as the speaker and the hearer. As Kaplan (1978) says,
a context of utterance always designates a speaker, but a given circumstance of evaluation
might lack one.
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the assertion becomes a presupposition, and because presuppositions are propo-
sitions that all interlocutors are publicly committed to, a successful assertion
bears on the outlooks of all of the interlocutors. It follows that successful asser-
tion depends on consensus, so it is best to avoid making assertions that will not
make it into the common ground. This predicts that people will say ‘φ’ instead
of ‘I think that φ’ more when ‘φ’ is likely to be accepted, as shown above.
Thus outlook-based semantics affords a simple and unified theory of assertion
that handles both discretionary and non-discretionary content. World-judge
relativism does not.
Further assumptions about pragmatics are straightforwardly integrated into
outlook-based semantics as well. Above, we implemented a Maxim of Quality,
and maxims of Quantity and Relation can be formalized straightforwardly in the
standard way as well, for example in the style of Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984)
and Groenendijk & Roelofsen (2009) using questions under discussion (QUDs),
where questions are sets of propositions (hence set of sets of outlooks). The
Maxim of Relation can be formalized as a requirement that the contribution
at least partially resolve the QUD (where resolve has a technical meaning),
and Quantity can be formalized as a requirement that the speaker choose the
strongest of the assertions that satisfy Quality and Relation. Since outlooks
are formally and functionally identical to possible worlds, it is easy to adapt
existing theories to this framework.
5 Formal system
We now give a small fragment of English with outlook-based semantics. In
the style of Montague’s “The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary
English,” we will define a language L, and then specify translations from natural
language expressions into the logic.
5.1 Syntax of the formal language
I will not lay out the syntactic rules for L; it should become sufficiently clear
once we go through the semantics. Suffice it to say that it contains variables,
individual constants, predicate constants, connectives, and special indexical con-
stants such as i picking out the speaker. Each expression in our logic will be
assigned a type, drawn from the set of types defined recursively in the style of
Montague (1973).
1. e and t are types
2. If σ and τ are types, then ⟨σ, τ⟩ is a type.
3. If τ is a type, then ⟨s, τ⟩ is a type.
The language contains an infinite number of variables vi,τ for each type τ and
each natural number i; in addition, the variables x, y and z are of type e, the
variable P is of type ⟨e, t⟩, and the variable p is of type ⟨s, t⟩.
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5.2 Semantics of the formal language
For each type, there is a corresponding domain; De is the set of individuals, Dt
is the set of truth values, and D⟨σ,τ⟩ is the set of functions from Dσ to Dτ . For
any type τ , D⟨s,τ⟩ is the domain of functions from possible worlds to Dτ . I also
assume that for every type τ , there is an ‘undefined object’ for every type mτ ,
defined in the style of LaPierre (1992).
An outlook-based model is a tuple
M = ⟨C,De,Dt,Ω,W,∝,A,R, I⟩
where:
• C is a non-empty set, the set of contexts. Following Kaplan (1977), a
context of utterance c is taken to be a tuple determining among other
things the speaker (or author) of the utterance sp(c) and a world w(c).
If c ∈ C then sp(c) ∈De and w(c) ∈W.
• De is a set of individuals
• Dt is a set of truth values: T, F, and m
• Ω is a set of outlooks
• W is a set of worlds
• ∝ is a one-to-one relation among mutually non-overlapping subsets of Ω
and elements of W
• A is the set of agents, a subset of D
• R is a set of accessibility relations Ra, one for each a ∈ A, each being a
binary relation on Ω specifying the doxastic state for each agent at each
outlook
• I is a valuation function assigning to each non-logical constant in the
language an intension, which is a function from outlooks to extensions of
the appropriate type. For the extension of an expression α at outlook o
we write Io(α). If α is of type τ , then for any outlook o, Io(α) ∈Dτ .
If O ∝ w for some set of outlooks O and some world w, then O is called the
refinement class for w and each of the outlooks o ∈ O is a refinement of w.
Against the background of a model determiningW, Ω and a one-to-one rela-
tion ∝ between worlds and their refinement classes, we can make the following
distinctions:
• Proposition (revised)
A proposition is a (total) function from outlooks to truth values.
• Objective proposition (revised)
A proposition p is objective if there is no w ∈ W such that there are
refinements o, o′ ∈ Ω of w such that p(o) = T and p(o′) = F.
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• Discretionary proposition (revised)
A proposition p is discretionary iff there is some w ∈ W such that there
are refinements o, o′ ∈ Ω of w and p(o) = T and p(o′) = F.
• Strongly discretionary proposition (revised)
A proposition p is strongly discretionary iff for all w ∈W, there are refine-
ments o, o′ ∈ Ω of w such that p(o) = T and p(o′) = F.
We have in addition the following relativized notions:
• Information state
An information state is a set of outlooks.
• C-restricted refinement class
Where C is an information state, the C-restricted refinement class of a
world w, written w ↾ C, is the set of outlooks in C that are refinements of
w.
• Objective relative to an information state
A proposition p is objective relative to an information state C iff there is
no C-restricted refinement class w ↾ C such that o, o′ ∈ w ↾ C and p(o) = T
and p(o′) = F.
• Discretionary relative to an information state
A proposition p is discretionary relative to an information state C iff there
is some C-restricted refinement class w ↾ C such that o, o′ ∈ w ↾ C and
p(o) = T and p(o′) = F.
• Strongly discretionary relative to an information state
A proposition p is strongly discretionary relative to an information state
C iff for all non-empty C-restricted refinement classes w ↾ C, there are
o, o′ ∈ w ↾ C such that p(o) = T and p(o′) = F.
The last of these notions is used for subjective attitude verbs.
The ordinary denotation of an expression depends on:
• a model M
• a context of utterance c
• a context set C (a set of outlooks)
• a variable assignment g – a total function whose domain consists of the
variables of the language such that if u is a variable of type τ then g(u) ∈
Dτ
• and an outlook o
We write: JαKM,c,C,g,o
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for ‘the denotation of α with respect to M , c, C, g and o’.20
Non-logical constants (terms, predicates, relations) depend on the valuation
function I provided by the model:
• If α is a non-logical constant, then JαKM,c,C,g,o = Io(α).
Variables depend on an assignment function g:
• If u is a variable, then JuKM,c,C,g,o = g(u).
Indexical constants depend on the context of utterance. In particular, the special
constant i is the one that is interpreted as the speaker of the utterance.
• JiKM,c,C,g,o = sp(c).
The semantics of a complex expression of the form α(β) is defined through the
rule of application:
• If α is of type ⟨σ, τ⟩ and β is of type σ, then
Jα(β)KM,c,C,g,o = JαKM,c,C,g,o(JβKM,c,C,g,o).
For example (supposing Io(a) is Anna):
• Jhappy(a)KM,c,C,g,o = Io(happy)(Io(a))= 1 iff Anna is happy in o
• Jhappy(i)KM,c,C,g,o = Io(happy)(sp(c))= 1 iff the speaker of context c is happy in o
Lambda-abstraction is defined as follows (see Dowty et al. 1981 for a pedagogical
presentation):
• If u is a variable of type τ then Jλu[α]KM,c,C,g,o = the function f such that
for all d: f(d) = JαKM,c,C,g[x→d],o
We also avail ourselves of a description operator:
• Jιu[φ]KM,c,C,g,o = d if {x ∶ JφKM,c,g[u→d],o = T} = {d}; me otherwise.
Equality, the connectives, and quantifiers over individuals are defined as follows.
• Jα = βKM,c,C,g,o = T if JαKM,c,C,g,o = JβKM,c,C,g,o and F otherwise.
• If φ and ψ are formulas, then Jφ ∧ ψKM,c,g,o, and Jφ ∨ ψKM,c,C,g,o are de-
fined as in Table 1. These are the ‘Weak Kleene’ interpretations of the
connectives, according to which m is interpreted as ‘nonsense’.21
20In case the semantic value of an expression α is the same for all assignment functions,
it has an assignment-independent denotation JαKM,c,C,o. This can be further simplified by
dropping M and C, allowing us to write simply JαKc,o or JαKc;o as I have done in the main
text above.
21With the help of the other unary operators in Table 1, the Strong Kleene connectives can
be reconstructed.
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∧ T F m
T T F m
F F F m
m m m m
∨ T F m
T T T m
F T F m
m m m m
¬
T F
F T
m m
∂
T T
F m
m m
Table 1: Interpretation of the connectives (Weak Kleene)
• If φ is a formula, then J¬φKM,c,g,o and are defined as in Table 1, where
the rows indicate JφKM,c,g,o, and the columns, for the binary connectives,
indicate JψKM,c,C,g,o. (∂[φ] can be glossed as ‘presupposing φ’)
• If u is a variable of type τ and φ is a formula then:
J∀u[φ]KM,c,C,g,o = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
m if for all d ∈Dτ , JφKM,c,C,g[u→d],o =m
F if there is a d ∈Dτ such that JφKM,c,C,g[u→d],o = F
T otherwise
The modal operators, which will be used in the semantics of attitude verbs,
are defined as follows:22
• If α is an expression of type e such that JαKM,c,C,g,o ∈ A, and φ is an
expression of type t, then:J◻αφKM,c,C,g,o = T if for all o′ such that RJαKM,c,g,o(o, o′): JφKM,c,C,g,o′ = T,
and F otherwise.◇a is the dual of ◻a for all appropriate a.
The proposition expressed by φ (or intension of φ) relative to M , c, C, and
g, written JφKM,c,C,g¢ is that function from outlooks to truth values f such that
for all o ∈ Ω, f(o) = JφKM,c,C,g,o. Relative toM , c, C, and g, what tycka requires
of its complement φ is that the proposition JφKM,c,C,g¢ is strongly discretionary
relative to C. The formal language contains a constant encapsulating this no-
tion:
(47) Jdiscretionary(φ)KM,c,C,g,o = T iff JφKM,c,C,g¢ is strongly discretionary
relative to C
The intension of an expression α is denoted in the object language using ˆα.
The ˇ operator goes in the other direction:
• JˆαKM,c,C,g,o denotes JαKM,c,C,g¢ .
• JˇαKM,c,C,g,o is defined if α is of type ⟨s, τ⟩ for some τ ; in that case it
denotes: JˇαKM,c,C,g,o(o)
22Note that combining type theory with modal logic in the way that Montague does in IL,
and as we have done here, has been argued to be problematic by Muskens (2006). Muskens
offers an alternative using explicit quantification over worlds as in Gallin’s (1975) Ty2. We
use Montague’s style here for the purposes of comparison with other theories in the literature
on predicates of personal taste.
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In general φ is equivalent to ˇˆφ; we make use of this equivalence to simplify
some representations in the examples below.
5.3 Translations
We now translate natural language expressions into expressions of this logic.
We use a grammar to define a set of well-formed trees, and then for each tree
χ we define a set of translations χ′ by induction on the translation relation ↝.
Here are some lexical entries.
1. the ↝ λPιx[P (x)]
2. a ↝ λP [P ]
3. Mary ↝m
4. John ↝ j
5. I/me ↝ i
6. chili ↝ λx[chili(x)]
7. doctor ↝ λx[doctor(x)]
8. tasty ↝ λx[tasty(x)]
9. is/am ↝ λP [P ]
10. thinks ↝ λpλx[◻x[ˇp]]
11. tycker ↝ λpλx[∂(discretionary(ˇp)) ∧ ◻x[ˇp]]
The last two entries involve the same use of types and intensionality that Mon-
tague (1973) uses in his treatment of necessarily.
Complement clauses must then have denotations of type ⟨s, t⟩. We thus
introduce the following special composition rule for embedded clause:
• [cp φ ] ↝ ˆφ′
where φ↝ φ.
Note that ˆ is not a function, so this is not a special case of Functional Appli-
cation.
Otherwise, to put the meanings of natural language expressions together, we
will use a set of composition rules, including:
(48) Functional Application (FA)
If α ↝ α′⟨σ,τ⟩ and β ↝ β′σ, and γ is an expression consisting of α and β,
then:
γ ↝ α′(β′)
For example, I am a doctor has the compositional analysis in (49a), and
the truth conditions in (49b). Notice that its truth conditions depend on the
context of utterance.
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(49) a. doctor(i)
i
I
λx[doctor(x)]
λP [P ]
am
λx[doctor(x)]
λP [P ]
a
λx[doctor(x)]
doctor
b. Jdoctor(i)KM,c,g,o = T if Io(doctor)(sp(c)) = T; else F.
Spoken by two different individuals, I am a doctor will have different contents.
This correctly predicts that if someone asserts, I am a doctor, and you are not
a doctor, it is not appropriate to respond, No, I am not a doctor!
The compositional analysis of The chili is tasty is given in (50a), and the
truth conditions are given in (50b).
(50) a. tasty(ιx[chili(x)])
ιx[chili(x)]
λP [ιx[P (x)]]
the
λx[chili(x)]
chili
λx[tasty(x)]
λP [P ]
is
λx[tasty(x)]
tasty
b. Jtasty(ιx[chili(x)])]KM,c,g,o = m unless there is a unique chili in
o. If there is, then, letting s refer to the chili, the value is T if
Io(tasty)(s) = T; else F.
So the content of The chili is tasty does not depend on the speaker. This means
that it is potentially the subject of genuine disagreement.
In contrast, the content of I think the chili is tasty does depend on the
speaker:23
(51) a. ◻i[tasty(ιx[chili(x)])]
i
I
λx[◻x[tasty(ιx[chili(x)])]]
think
tasty(ιx[chili(x)])
the chili is tasty
23The CP containing the chili is tasty translates as ˆtasty(ιx[chili(x)]); the intension
operator ˆ is then ‘cancelled out’ by the extension operator ˇ introduced in the lexical entry
for the attitude verb. The simplified expressions are shown in the tree.
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b. J◻i[tasty(ιx[chili(x)])]KM,c,g,o = T if for all o′ such thatRsp(c)(o, o′):Jtasty(ιx[chili(x)])KM,c,g,o′ = T; else F.
So if someone says I think the chili is tasty, it is not predicted to be appropriate
to respond, No, I don’t think the chili is tasty, and this prediction is correct.
The corresponding sentence in Swedish with tycka would translate as:
(52) Jag tycker att chilin är god ↝
∂[discretionary(tasty(ιx[chili(x)]))] ∧ ◻i[tasty(ιx[chili(x)])]]
This is defined with respect to M , g, c and o iff Jtasty(ιx[chili(x)])KM,g,c¢ is
discretionary, and true if the speaker of c accepts that proposition.
It should be clear that we have not achieved any major technical feats here;
structurally, this looks very much like the standard picture. No extra judge
parameters, no contexts of assessment. Except for the structure of the models,
this is just plain old Kaplanian semantics with a little bit of epistemic logic
thrown in, cast in a type-theoretic framework where we translate natural lan-
guage expressions to logical expressions.
6 Summary
This paper has developed and defended a simple relativist view on statements
regarding taste and other discretionary statements along the lines advocated
by Kölbel (2002, 2003). Outlook-based semantics replaces possible worlds with
outlooks, where outlooks are refinements of worlds. From the user’s perspective,
as it were, the framework is identical to the standard Kaplanian framework
(modulo the addition of a context set parameter), making it easy to work with,
extend, and compare. Furthermore, the framework genuinely captures faultless
disagreement, gives a satisfactory account of subjective attitude verbs while
allowing for lack of opinionatedness, and derives the core pragmatic behavior of
discretionary talk without stipulation.
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